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Abstract 
 
Industrial relations and employment regulation are central elements of the national institutional 
framework shaping country-level differences in job quality. However, researchers are also 
interested in within-country variation by sector. International sector comparisons can shed light 
on the role of national institutions, individual employer approaches and workplace unions in 
shaping outcomes within a sector. This article uses qualitative data on pay and working time 
in the café industry in France, Norway and the UK to weigh the effects of institutions and 
employer differentiation on worker outcomes in a sector particularly challenging for union 
organisation. The findings identify the importance of national institutions for worker outcomes, 
and for shaping the scope at organisational level for employers and unions to make a difference. 
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Introduction 
There is evidence of considerable variation in job quality indicators across advanced economies 
linked to differences in national institutional arrangements (Gallie 2007, Holman and 
McLelland 2011). The proportion of the workforce which is low paid1, to take one example, is 
above 20 percent in the US, UK and Germany compared with below 10 percent in Denmark, 
Norway and France (Eurostat 2017a). The strength of trade unions, collective bargaining and 
labour market regulations have been identified as central in explaining differences in low pay, 
along with other aspects of job quality (Gautié and Schmitt 2010). While these macro-level 
country comparisons help to identify average country differences, there are important 
questions concerning the extent to which societal institutions affect job quality across and 
within sectors.  
Macro-level studies have been criticised for neglecting regional and sector differences 
and for overlooking relatively ‘new’ industries where key features of the national institutional 
framework may not apply (Crouch et al 2009, Lloyd and Payne 2016). Carré and Tilly 
(2012:80) argue that more meso-level comparisons which ‘examine a single sector across 
countries’ are required particularly when examining low paid service sector jobs, given that 
the comparative capitalisms literature has focused mainly on unionised manufacturing. Such 
an approach allows a more nuanced assessment of the role played by national institutions, the 
relationship with sector dynamics, and the potential space for individual employer agency and 
workplace trade unions. Rich qualitative data, drawing upon workplace cases studies and 
employee experiences, can be particularly helpful but remain rare. 
This article explores two central questions. First are national institutions able to 
influence job quality outcomes in more or less all organisations in a ‘hard to organise’ sector, 
and second, in countries with weaker regulation, is there more scope for employer choice 
and/or union workplace organisation to make a significant difference? To explore these 
questions, a meso-level approach is used to compare pay and working time practices in the 
hospitality sector in France, Norway and the UK. At the core of the analysis is the role of social 
relations and power in shaping the interactions between national institutions, sector and the 
workplace. There are major country differences, for example, in the power of trade unions to 
influence national institutional frameworks. However, some features of the ‘national system’ 
may not apply or be difficult to enforce in ‘new’ or less organised sectors (Bosch and Lehndorff 
2005, Jaehrling and Méhaut 2012), potentially leading to more similarities across countries 
                                                          
1
 Defined as below two-thirds of the median hourly wage  
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(Bechter and Brandl 2015). Furthermore, weak labour standards may allow for greater within 
country variation, reflecting differences in employer approach or the ability of unions to 
organise some workplaces (Findlay et al 2017, Simms 2017).  
The three countries in this study were selected as well-documented examples of highly 
contrasting national models. The UK is typically identified as a ‘liberal market’ or ‘neo-liberal’ 
economy, with lightly regulated product, capital and labour markets, and weak trade unions 
and employer organisations. In such a case, individual employers might be thought to have 
considerable latitude in determining their organisational approach. However, unlike the US – 
the model’s quintessential archetype – UK unions have not declined to the same extent and 
there is stronger labour market regulation. Norway, variously referred to as a ‘coordinated’ or 
‘neo-corporatist’ economy and ‘Scandinavian welfare state’, has a labour market model 
underpinned by strong trade unions and extensive multi-level collective bargaining. Again, it 
is somewhat distinctive among the Nordic countries, having rich oil revenues, lower union 
density, and a model of tripartite cooperation that has proven highly durable in the face of neo-
liberalism. France, often labelled as ‘state regulated’, is noted for its very low union density, 
extensive legal regulation of the labour market and near-universal collective bargaining. It 
provides a good test of whether state regulation can improve job quality in lower end service 
sectors, despite the absence of strong workplace unions. 
Hospitality was chosen as a private service sector associated with low pay, precarious 
work and a low level of collective organisation (Jaehrling and Méhaut 2012), where services 
have to be delivered close to the customer and jobs are ‘rooted’ within the ‘local’ economy. 
While, on one level, it is an unpromising sector for improving job quality, it does not face the 
same pressures as more internationally tradeable ones. Job quality comprises multiple factors 
(Holman and McLelland 2011) and, to allow for systematic comparison, we focus on pay and 
working time. In hospitality, it is useful to explore these two elements together, given 
widespread concerns around the growth in involuntary part-time work and zero and variable 
hours contracts, and their implications for security of income and work-life balance (O’Sullivan 
et al 2017, Ilsøe et al 2017).  
The first section of this article examines existing approaches to the comparative study 
of pay and working time, and outlines a conceptual framework for integrating national 
institutions and sector dynamics with that of individual employer agency and workplace 
unions. A brief overview is then provided of existing research in the hospitality sector, followed 
by a discussion of the research method, which draws on over 100 interviews with managers 
and workers from 30 different organisations in the café sector. The data are used to undertake 
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a comparative analysis of the influences on pay and working time, and the effects for workers 
across and within the three countries. The conclusion discusses the implications for 
comparative analysis and for improving job quality in the hospitality sector.   
 
Integrating the national, sector and organisation 
The comparative capitalisms literature, which has primarily focused on national 
distinctiveness, has been criticised for neglecting internal variation within countries and the 
role played by the sector (Crouch et al 2009, Grimshaw and Lehndorff 2010). Employers in a 
sector, it is argued, ‘face similar pressures and options in the organization of work and labour 
relations by virtue of common activities and constraints’ (Arrowsmith 2010:181). 
Consequently, industrial relations in a sector may have more commonalities across countries 
than with other sectors in the same country (Bechter and Brandl 2015).  
Although the sector has long been considered an important analytical category in 
industrial relations (Hollingsworth and Streeck 1994), rather less attention has focused on the 
relationship between national institutions and the extent of internal country diversity. There is 
evidence that some countries may be more resilient to sector pressures (Refslund and Sørensen 
2016) retaining greater homogeneity in institutions. Bechter et al (2012:194) claim that for the 
Nordic countries and France, it would ‘appear legitimate to speak of national models’ of 
industrial relations, compared to other countries with more mixed patterns. In relation to pay, 
Gautié and Schmitt (2010) identify Denmark and France as possessing ‘inclusive’ pay-setting 
institutions whereby close to all workers are covered by collective bargaining. Not only are 
there more similarities in institutional arrangements across sectors, there are also positive 
outcomes in terms of relatively few low paid jobs, compared to more differentiated countries, 
such as Germany and the UK.  
Few international comparative studies have examined differences in working-time 
across sectors. Berg et al (2014:810) propose three national ‘configurations’ for how ‘working 
time practices are established or altered’, which have implications for variation within a 
country. The ‘mandated’ approach, represented by France, relies on universal state-legal 
regulation which substitutes for weak workplace unions, and is thought to deliver uniformity 
across sectors. The ‘negotiated’ model, exemplified by Sweden, is characterised by extensive 
collective bargaining as the main form of regulation. This approach offers the potential for 
more sector variation in outcomes than with the mandated configuration reflecting differences 
in trade union power across the economy. The US typifies the ‘unilateral’ approach, where the 
organisation of working time is said to be largely at the discretion of the employer due to 
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limited collective bargaining and weak legal regulations. Consequently, we might expect more 
variable outcomes reflecting differences in the labour market power of groups of workers 
and/or the competitive strategies of employers.  
The mandated and negotiated configurations of working time are held to provide better 
outcomes for workers in general, but with the potential for less adaptability to worker 
preferences in the former (Berg et al 2014:832-833). Evidence on the validity of these models 
is limited, although surveys suggest workers have more control over hours and work schedules 
in Scandinavia (Lyness et al 2012, Anttila et al 2015). While Berg et al’s (2014) approach is 
helpful, questions remain over whether these ‘configurations’ apply to other countries and if 
they can account for sub-national variation. Indeed, they stress these are ‘ideal types’, and 
research is required to explore how ‘working-time practices in specific industries and 
occupations differ’ (2014: 833-834). 
Studies of job quality, encompassing pay and working time, are increasingly 
emphasising the importance of integrating national institutional settings with specific sector 
dynamics. However, there is often an absence of the role played by individual organisations 
and the extent to which there is space for different approaches within a sector and under 
different national institutional arrangements. Carré and Tilly (2012:89) are an exception, 
arguing that in low paying sectors, such as retail and hospitality, national institutions are more 
important than employer practices in explaining international differences in job quality. In 
contrast, employer strategies, and (to a lesser extent) union organisation, are more significant 
in accounting for within-country variation.  
In relation to employer ‘choice’ of competitive strategy, Carré and Tilly (2012) follow 
a well-established view in distinguishing between the ‘high road’, based on high-quality goods 
and services, and the ‘low road’, centred on cost minimisation (Schuler and Jackson 1987). The 
former is often held to be associated with higher skilled work and better wages and conditions, 
the latter with a predominantly low-skilled, low-paid, insecure workforce (Frenkel 2005, 
Boxall and Purcell 2015). The assumption is that organisations seeking to differentiate 
themselves through higher product or service quality require a more motivated and skilled 
workforce and, therefore, have greater incentive to provide workers with enhanced benefits, 
such as training opportunities, higher pay and better work-life balance. Profit margins are also 
expected to be higher, affording more scope to enhance job quality. The evidence, however, on 
the link between product market positioning and job quality in hospitality and retailing is 
mixed. Of the few studies available, some suggest quality-focused approaches may translate 
into better pay and conditions (Carré and Tilly 2012, Knox and Warhurst 2018), while others 
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find that this is not necessarily the case (Bailey and Bernhardt 1997, Gadrey and Jany-Catrice 
2000, Lloyd et al 2013). 
Furthermore, it has long been argued that the scope for ‘low road’ or ‘high road’ 
competitive approaches is partly shaped by national institutions (Streeck 1987, Finegold and 
Soskice 1988). In sectors such as hospitality, one might expect fewer opportunities to pursue a 
low cost competitive strategy in countries with high legal minimum standards for pay and 
working time. Organisations may converge in their practices if they feel they have little to gain 
from going beyond the minimum, while trade unions may find it difficult to mobilise workers 
to achieve only marginal benefits. In countries that rely primarily on strong national unions 
negotiating collective agreements rather than legal regulation, some employers in less 
organised sectors may be able to ‘opt out’ and pursue a ‘low road’ approach. Their ability to 
follow such a path is likely to depend on broader factors that shape the supply of labour at the 
lower end, such as the ‘type of welfare state’ (Bosch and Lehndorff 2005:10), the role of 
migrant labour and the student/youth labour market (Hauschildt et al 2015). In a country with 
weak legal standards, employers might ‘race to the bottom’ reducing wages and conditions as 
far as possible or, alternatively, there might be greater diversity of approach. Some 
organisations may offer better pay and conditions as part of their competitive strategy (Sung 
and Ashton 2015) or they may face pressure from recruitment difficulties or workplace trade 
unions where they exist.  
The above discussion underlines the complexity of integrating the national, sector and 
organisation levels, with the potential for a range of influences and outcomes. It also shows 
major gaps in evidence and the importance of exploring variation in employees’ experiences 
within a sector. The next section draws on existing research to provide a brief overview of 
employment conditions in the hospitality sector, referring to specific data on France, Norway 
and the UK. 
 
 
Pay and Working Time in the Hospitality Sector 
The hospitality sector has a number of common features or ‘sector pressures’, such as low 
barriers to entry, limited capital investment and technology requirements, localised markets, 
temporal variability in consumer demand and large numbers of low skilled tasks (Gerogiannis 
et al 2012, Eurostat 2017b). The result is an environment often characterised by highly 
competitive markets, severe price pressure, high labour turnover and many poor quality jobs. 
While MNCs operate in certain segments, e.g. fast food and hotel chains, a myriad of national 
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operators, franchises and small independents make it hard for employers to organise 
collectively. Union organisation is also rendered more difficult by such conditions, along with 
the small size of many workplaces (Vanselow et al 2010, Jaehrling and Méhaut, 2012). 
Consequently, union density is low in all three countries in this study, ranging from 24 percent 
in Norway, 3 percent in the UK and 4 percent in France, compared with national unionisation 
rates of 49, 23 and 11 percent respectively2. 
There are substantial differences in collective bargaining institutions and coverage in 
hospitality across the three countries. The French national model ensures all workers are 
covered by sector agreements as these are legally extended to all relevant workplaces. In 
Norway, only a third of the hospitality workforce are in workplaces where employers have 
signed the sector collective agreement and most of these are in accommodation rather than food 
services (Fellesforbundet 2017)3. It is estimated that a quarter of workers are paid less than the 
sector minimum. In the UK, just four percent of workers are covered by company-level 
collective bargaining (DBEIS 2018). While 47 percent of hospitality workers are classified as 
low paid across the EU27, there are considerable country differences, ranging from 66 percent 
in the UK, 38 percent in Norway, and 14 percent in France (Eurostat 2017a).4 There is little 
research, however, on the extent of organisational differences. A study by Vanselow et al 
(2010:287) of hotel cleaners in five European countries found minimal variation in pay levels 
across workplaces within each country. 
In many areas of hospitality, employers are faced with consumer demand that varies 
over the day, week and year. Matching staff more closely to business requirements is an 
important way in which labour costs can be reduced. Trade unions and campaign groups, 
particularly in the UK and US, have voiced major concerns over the growth in this sector of 
insecure working time arrangements (TUC 2015, DePillis 2015). Unpredictability and 
fluctuations in the number of hours and days worked may result in inadequate and insecure 
income as well as ‘time based’ and ‘strain-based’ work-life conflict (Henly and Lambert 
2014:991-992). Notwithstanding a few studies of temporal flexibility in the retail sector (Wood 
2016), there is little research on hospitality. A rare US study by Lambert et al (2012:296) 
highlights growth in ‘practices that increase volatility and unpredictability in workers’ hours 
and schedules’ (also Royle 2010). A particular feature is the use of zero and variable hours 
                                                          
2
 Norway data from 2016 (Nergaard 2018), UK Data from 2017 (DBEIS 2018), French data from 2013 (DARES 
2016). 
3
 From January 2018, the sector collective agreement minimum rates was extended to cover all workers in the 
sector. 
4
 Vanselow et al. (2010) suggest the figure for France is nearer 20 percent. 
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contracts, where workers either have no guaranteed hours or are contracted for a minimum 
number, often with the ‘promise’ of more hours, business requirements permitting. 
An organisation’s ability to pursue this type of temporal labour flexibility can be 
constrained by state-legal regulations of working time, any collective bargaining agreements 
and union influence at the workplace (Gautié and Schmitt 2010). In the absence of workplace 
unions or works councils, relying on legal rights or collective agreements may be problematic 
as these still have to be enforced. Jaerhling and Méhaut (2012:702) found that while collective 
bargaining has been relatively effective in Germany and France in improving pay in low waged 
service sector jobs, there is a ‘representative gap’ in respect of working time leading to a 
‘flexibilization and intensification’ of work, whereby some employers ‘even go beyond what 
is legally permitted.’ Compliance issues have also been evidenced in Norway. Labour 
Inspectors found that 79 percent of their 3000 inspections in the hospitality sector during 2015-
16 breached the law, primarily in relation to working time (Tariffnemndas 2017). 
The hospitality sector is one of the most difficult for unions to organise. Even in ‘co-
ordinated’ Norway, collective bargaining remains patchy and low pay is extensive. Although 
we know little about working time outcomes, the re-distributional effect of strong unions at 
national level appears to be limited in parts of hospitality. In France, labour law is more 
significant in reducing low pay, but limited workplace union organisation places a question 
mark over how far employers abide by working time regulations. In the UK, there is a similar 
reliance on labour law, but with much weaker provision associated with endemic low pay and 
the potential for widespread insecurity in working time. 
 
Research Design 
Cross-national sector comparisons present challenges for researchers, particularly when 
weighing the effects of national institutions, sector dynamics, and individual employers and 
unions at the workplace (Carré and Tilly 2012:79). A useful approach is to look across a variety 
of workplaces, using data from managers and workers, and to triangulate this with other data 
sources, including industry stakeholders (Gautié and Schmitt 2010). The café industry was 
selected as an under-researched sub-sector of hospitality that has expanded rapidly in all the 
three countries, and for the predominance of one occupational group in each outlet. In this 
study, a ‘café’ is an establishment providing non-alcoholic drinks and a variety of pre-prepared 
or quick-to-prepare food, such as sandwiches. Focusing on the pay and working time of café 
assistants ensures a level of consistency in the comparison, particularly as skill and task 
requirements are broadly similar (Lloyd and Payne 2016).  
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The main approach involves moving beyond the national and sector institutional levels 
to focus on the experience of employees in the workplace. The study, therefore, predominantly 
draws on the views of managers, supervisors and café assistants at workplace level with some 
broader perspectives from industry level informants5. Purposeful sampling was used to select 
the cafés. The aim was to reflect the industry profile of each country, for example the size of 
organisation and market segment related to quality and cost, which is critical to exploring 
differences across countries and variability within a sector. There are differences in the size of 
companies and the role of independents reflected in the spread of cafés selected. The UK is 
dominated by large chains producing standardised, mid-quality products, Norway by 
independents and small chains focusing on higher-quality products, and France by large chains 
and independents with a broader mix of market segments. The locations included medium and 
large cities in the Midlands in England, Oslo in Norway, and a southern city and Paris in France.  
Adopting a multi-case study approach, the research draws primarily upon data collected 
through semi-structured interviews with café assistants, supervisors and managers. Access was 
occasionally arranged via head offices but mostly negotiated with local managers through 
‘walk-in’ requests. The sample comprises 43 outlets from 30 organisations (Table 1). 
Interviews with managers typically lasted around one hour and focused on the level and factors 
influencing pay, and the organisation of working time; those with café assistants took 
approximately 30 minutes and covered pay and bonuses, working hours and union 
organisation. Over 100 workplace interviews were conducted between 2010 and 2011. The 
next section outlines the main legal and regulatory structures relating to pay and working time 
in the café industry in the three countries.  
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Pay and Working Time Institutional Structures 
In the UK, there is no sector collective bargaining covering hospitality. Employees working in 
cafés may have their pay and conditions determined by company or workplace collective 
bargaining but this is extremely rare. As with hospitality in general, the overwhelming majority 
of workers rely on national legal rights for protection. For pay, this is the national minimum 
                                                          
5
 Interviews were conducted with representatives from the Sector Skills Council and People First in the UK, 
employers’ associations NHO and HSH (Handels- og Servicenæringens Hovedorganisasjon) and union officials 
from Fellesforbundet and HK in Norway, employers’ association SNARR and union official from CGT in 
France. 
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wage which, since its introduction in 1999, has been set at a relatively low level. In relation to 
working time, there are no additional rights for unsocial hours payments or overtime, and no 
legal regulations specifying that an employment contract must reflect actual hours worked. The 
only legal constraint on scheduling is the European Working Time Directive, which covers rest 
periods and the maximum length of the working day.  
In Norway, employment law derives primarily from the Work Environment Act 
(Arbeidsmiljøloven) which encodes the rights of individual employees, along with rules 
governing collective relationships. Collective bargaining is the main mechanism to determine 
pay and conditions. Consequently, the Act provides no statutory minimum wage and only 
limited rights in relation to working time; contracts of employment must nevertheless reflect 
hours worked and two weeks’ notice is required prior to scheduling changes. The hospitality 
collective agreement between Fellesforbundet/LO (Landsorganisasjonen i Norge) and NHO 
Reiseliv/NHO (Næringslivets Hovedorganisasjon), which covers the café industry, provides 
higher levels of protection but is only binding on companies that are signatories6. The 
agreement sets a minimum pay rate, or ‘tariff’, for an unskilled adult worker at 128.32 kroner 
(2010–12), a relatively low rate in Norway. It also establishes rates for overtime, unsocial hours 
and public holidays. Workers must be provided with their work schedule four weeks in advance 
and receive two months’ notice prior to changes. 
In France, the Code du travail is the basis of employment law and provides minimum 
standards, with the sector agreements building upon them. Employment contracts must reflect 
hours worked, with restrictions on the number of additional hours part-timers can work. All 
cafés are covered by either the ‘fast food’ or the ‘bakery’ collective agreement. Most are in the 
‘fast food’ sector where agreements are concluded between the employers’ body, SNARR 
(Syndicat National de l'Alimentation et de la Restauration Rapide), and the five main trade 
unions in the sector.7 Legal extension mechanisms mean all workers are covered, with pay at 
entry level broadly in line with the national minimum wage (SMIC). Since 2011, the fast food 
agreement has provided additional pay for night work, and a small tenure-related annual bonus. 
Employers must provide at least 10 days’ notice for changes to schedules. Since 1998, contracts 
must be at least 20 hours a week unless a worker requests less, increased to 22 hours in 2012. 
The bakery agreement is slightly more generous, particularly in relation to payment for 
unsocial hours. Table 2 provides an overview of the main regulations in the three countries. 
                                                          
6
 In 2018, this position changed as minimum pay rates were generalised across the sector. 
7
 FGTA-FO, CGT, INOVA CFE-CGC, CFDT, and Federation CFTC-CSFV. 
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TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Pay in the Workplace 
Café work is a low paid job in all three countries, although there are important national 
differences. In the UK and France, national minimum wages are central to pay determination, 
while in Norway, the sector collective agreement acts as a ‘going rate’. Comparing across the 
three countries, using purchasing power parity, the UK minimum wage is lowest, with the 
French minimum wage (SMIC) 30 percent higher and the Norwegian collective agreement 
minimum tariff 70 percent higher (see Table 3). France has one of the highest statutory 
minimum wage rates in Europe. Even with the introduction in 2015 of the ‘National Living 
Wage’ in the UK, in effect a higher minimum wage for the over-25s, the gap with France for 
this age group has only narrowed to 22 percent (WSI 2017). These type of pay comparisons, 
however, take no account of non-wage benefits, such as pensions, sick pay and subsidised 
childcare. It is, therefore, useful to examine wages in relation to national pay structures. The 
UK is still in the worst position, with the minimum wage at 52 percent of median earnings in 
2011, compared to the SMIC at 63 percent in France and the collective agreement at 62 percent 
in Norway8. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Notwithstanding these national differences, how much variation is there in pay among 
café employers in each country? The expectation was that the UK would show the greatest 
variation and France would be the most standardised. Data for the highest paid café assistants 
found in each outlet are shown in Figure 1. In order to compare across the countries, pay is 
represented as a percentage of the national minimum wage in the UK and France, and of the 
sector minimum tariff in Norway. Although the data cannot be claimed to be representative of 
the industry, it provides an indication of the spread of pay across organisations.  
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
                                                          
8 Authors’ calculations based on full-time equivalent median monthly rates for France and Norway 
(https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/1280904, https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/table/08054/); hourly rates of all 
workers for the UK (Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 2011) 
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In France, there is considerable uniformity across organisations. In all but one (an 
artisanal bakery where pay was 10 percent higher), pay was set at the level of the collective 
agreement (fast food, bakery) or the higher civil service pay scales. These findings indicate the 
importance of the sector collective agreement in establishing the ‘going rate’. In fast food, the 
minimum rate in the collective agreement tracks the SMIC, with unions having little success 
in increasing pay beyond this. High turnover and a preponderance of young workers and 
students present challenges for union organisation, as a CGT (Confédération Générale du 
Travail) union official acknowledged: 
There is a high turnover which is very hard. There is the fact that unions are 
not necessarily very comfortable with young people…[and] particularly in 
fast food, there is a lot of union repression, and as soon as we have a rep who 
is a bit efficient, in general, they are shown the door.  
Although the SMIC is set close to the low pay threshold, many interviewees pointed out that 
the wage is still extremely difficult to live on, given the spiralling cost of rent and other bills. 
A café worker remarked: 
After 30 if you don’t get a higher position, you can’t have a life. Hours are 
demanding. Even if you like the job, you can’t make a family with it, the 
level of pay as well (Thomas, F-SandwichC).  
The only substantive pay differences, apart from the artisanal bakery, were in two of the larger 
organisations with company collective agreements where unions had secured annual profit-
related bonuses and ‘13th month’ payments9. 
For the majority of workers in the UK, pay was set at the national minimum wage. Five 
outlets (four organisations) paid higher. One of these (UK-Bakery1) was the only unionised 
organisation and collective bargaining at company level had raised wages to around seven 
percent above the minimum wage. The higher pay in UK-RetailA reflects the pay levels that 
are more typical in the retail sector. The other two organisations saw UK-Coffee1 paying some 
workers in one outlet around five percent higher, although other outlets paid the minimum 
wage. These differences reflected the relative success of the specific outlet and a tight local 
labour market. UK-CoffeeD was the exception, paying up to 12 percent above the minimum 
wage. Its product market position was not significantly different from a number of the other 
organisations in the study but the company had a widely publicised strategy of paying above 
the statutory minimum. 
                                                          
9
 A bonus normally equivalent to a month’s pay paid in December. A third company recently introduced 13 th 
month payments following a union campaign with rolling strike action. 
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None of the outlets found any difficulties in recruiting new staff at minimum wage 
levels. This was despite the minimum wage not providing a ‘living wage’ (Padley and Hirsch 
2017) and workers’ frequent complaints: 
It’s pretty rubbish. Yeah, it’s not good. I think we work harder than our pay 
indicates. (Karen, UK-RetailB) 
It’s disgusting. I’ve got two children and a mortgage and I have to work for 
minimum wage and it’s hard work… You are so undervalued. (Laura, UK-
Coffee3) 
Only one organisation (UK-RetailA) provided any premium payments for unsocial hours 
(working on Sundays), a practice that has largely disappeared from the retail sector. Café 
assistants at UK-Multibrand, for example, worked nights for the minimum wage, a situation 
not legally permissible in Norway or France. 
Contrary to expectation, the widest spread of pay was found not in the UK but in 
Norway where there is no statutory minimum wage or legally enforced sector pay agreement. 
Of the nine companies in Norway, only two had signed collective agreements. The union found 
it difficult to recruit members partly due to the large number of small employers and a 
predominantly young and transient workforce: 
one of our biggest problems with this group is our difficulty to get collective 
agreements because they are young… they are moving from one place to the 
other... It would be too much work to try to organise. (Union official, Handel 
og Kontor i Norge (HK))  
At N-Multibrand, a large MNC, unions had been more successful with a company agreement 
providing hourly wages up to 20 percent above the sector tariff, enabling the highest paid café 
assistants to be above official definitions of low pay. Most other organisations paid around the 
level of the sector tariff. Several managers reported that they felt this was necessary to retain 
staff, as one from N-BakerA explained: 
Because I want to have this good feeling that I pay my employees for what 
they do, and I want them to be happy or else they may go somewhere else.  
Union officials confirmed that retention was a problem but added that organisations 
also followed the tariff to avoid union organising drives. Having to make pension contributions 
and paying supplements for unsocial hours were cited as the main reasons why employers did 
not want to sign the collective agreement. Three out of seven non-signatories still made some 
additional payments for weekend working, albeit at a lower rate than the collective agreement. 
The one outlier in relation to pay was N-Sandwichco, a low-cost, low-quality franchised 
sandwich chain where pay was 75 per cent of the sector tariff. According to the union, franchise 
organisations were the most difficult to organise. Recruitment was possible although the outlet 
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only employed part-time student workers and, at the time, unlike other cafés, these were all 
from minority ethnic backgrounds or less developed oversees countries. There is evidence to 
indicate a substantial increase in workers with a foreign background in the hospitality sector, 
rising from 28 percent in 2008 to 43 per cent in 2015, with these workers more likely to be paid 
below the collective agreement tariff (Tariffnemndas 2017).   
Pay was not considered a major issue for most workers in the café sector in Norway, 
primarily because the role was almost exclusively filled by a student or young person on a ‘gap 
year’. Interviews with those solely reliant upon the income suggest that even though pay is low, 
it provides a wage that is still possible to live on, if only modestly. One manager explained 
how the expectation was that pay would be higher for older workers because ‘when you are 30, 
you have like a home, maybe children’ (manager, N-BakerB). Café assistants pointed out that 
better pay rates were available in supermarkets, which, as larger employers, were more likely 
to be covered by collective agreements and offer additional pay for unsocial hours. A café 
worker, who was paid 15 percent above the sector tariff, noted that, ‘You can get the same as 
a janitor, actually you can get more! There’s nothing special about the pay’ (Abdella, N-
Multibrand).  
The evidence indicates that while national minimum wages provide a floor in France 
and the UK, it has become the standard industry rate. There are fewer variations, including 
some small-scale increases paid by a couple of employers, which suggests little pursuit of ‘high 
road’ approaches to pay. In Norway, although most employers were not formal signatories to 
the sector collective agreement, most workers in the study were paid within 10 krone of the 
hourly tariff.  However, lack of inclusivity of pay-setting arrangements left some workers with 
pay well below 50 percent of the median. A key feature is that where unions are organised at 
company level they make some difference in all three countries.  
 
Control over Working Time 
As indicated in the earlier section, there are different national regulations in working time as 
well as sector collective agreements in Norway and France. In all the countries, cafés are 
subject to variation in customer numbers over the day and week. However, unlike other areas 
of hospitality, cafés outside of the transport sector typically open only during the day, although 
many open over the weekend. Given different national regulatory constraints, how much 
variation is there in the type of contracts offered and in stability and predictability of workers’ 
hours?  
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The lack of regulation in the UK was associated with the greatest diversity in approach 
from employers. Four companies provided relatively stable patterns of employment with full-
time contracts or fixed part-time contracts and shift systems that were the same each week or 
rotated on a regular basis. These organisations tended to recruit a wider range of employees in 
terms of age, although most were women with school-aged children. Use was also made of 
students for weekend work and occasional overtime. Across the other seven organisations, full-
time contracts for café assistants were rare. Instead, workers were typically employed on part-
time contracts of between 12 and 20 hours, with managers offering additional hours according 
to business need. In several cases, employees were frequently working full-time even though 
their contracts specified part-time hours. Most of these organisations also adopted a system 
where rotas were completed weekly. The number of hours and shift patterns could vary each 
week, while there were also changes ‘as and when’.  
These flexible employment practices were most apparent among the relatively new café 
chains which tended to recruit younger workers and students, including many male workers. 
UKCoffeeD stood out in terms of paying a higher wage but provided little security in working 
time and had cut the length of shifts to remove breaks. Students tended to be relatively 
accepting of such practices, and most local managers were responsive to their individual 
scheduling requirements. However, for older workers, those with children or with no additional 
source of income, the fluctuation in the number of hours was problematic. At UK-Multibrand, 
as part of a cost-cutting exercise, all full-time café workers were moved onto part-time 
contracts, with the promise of additional hours when available. Malika had been forced to 
accept this change, explaining that she then faced volatility in weekly hours: ‘I wasn’t happy 
at all because you’ve got bills to pay and stuff like that.’  
This ‘manager-controlled flexible scheduling’ (Wood 2016:1991) raised specific issues 
for workers who were required to work a minimum number of hours per week to qualify for 
certain statutory in-work benefits: 
it makes me angry… I don’t enjoy the job because it’s not stable. I want a 
full-time job, I want to know what I get every week and I don’t. (Amber, 
UK-CoffeeC) 
At UK-BakerB, UK-CoffeeA, UK-CoffeeC and UK-Sandwich, managers responded in various 
ways to tight targets on budgets, including sending workers home early without paying to the 
end of the shift, requesting they remain after their shift had finished, calling them to come in 
early or on a day off or not to come in at all. As one manager explained: ‘if I’m not making 
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that budget, I can send people home early… and if I’m exactly that budget I can call people in 
earlier’ (UK-CoffeeA). 
In France, the study found greater similarity among employers’ working time practices. 
Interviews with the employers’ organisation, SNARR, and the CGT union agreed that the fast 
food sector was dominated by part-time working, which was ‘imposed on certain workers and 
wanted by others’ (CGT). Other studies (eg. Nkuitchou Nkouatchet, 2005) indicate a relatively 
precarious experience in the fast food sector, and data show very high levels of involuntary 
part-time work across France (44 percent compared to 14 percent in the UK (Eurostat 2018)). 
In 2014, the Hollande government introduced a national 24-hour minimum week for part-time 
contracts and a tightening up on ‘exclusions’10. The cafés in this study appear somewhat 
different. The interviews suggest companies use a mix of contracts, with full-time permanent 
work available in most outlets, alongside the use of students on part-time contracts and summer 
temporary contracts. A number of organisations also employed young workers without BAC-
level qualifications on training contracts (contrats en alternance). Unlike the UK, there was 
little use of additional hours worked for part-timers.  
Work schedules in France were relatively stable. The larger organisations that operated 
in the airports had to cover periods late into the night and, therefore, used rotating shift patterns. 
Most of the other organisations gave workers the same shifts each week. There was little 
evidence that employers made extensive use of flexible scheduling, with some workers instead 
complaining of being unable to modify hours and fix schedules to suit their preferences. As 
one explained: ‘I work the mornings… I haven’t a choice’ (Nicholas, F-SandwichA), although 
his manager was flexible when it came to ad-hoc changes. Others commented that managers 
rotated shifts, but the schedule was ‘rigid and fixed’ (Elodie, F-SandwichD). Opportunities to 
negotiate individually improved the longer workers were in post. At F-Multibrand, Christelle 
had secured more preferable hours to fit around childcare arrangements and Emilie at F-IndepE 
commentated that ‘with seniority, they more or less listened to what I could do’. Full-time work 
was the main core of the workforce in nearly all these organisations. Weekend work and 
additional shifts at peak periods were mainly covered by students or by organising overlapping 
shifts in the middle of the day.  
In Norway, the data reveal two main approaches to employment contracts. One group 
of outlets employed both full-time and part-time workers, while others relied only on part-
timers. The employers that only used part-time workers included the lowest paying 
                                                          
10 Only students under 26 are excluded; other employees must make a request in writing. 
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organisation, which competed on cost, and two small, upmarket bakery chains that paid in line 
with the collective agreement. Product market strategy, therefore, does not appear to have any 
significant bearing on employers’ use of part-time working. Part-time workers were invariably 
school and university students, while full-timers were predominantly young workers (mostly 
female) taking time out from studying. A substantial proportion of these full-timers were from 
Sweden, attracted by higher wages. Some part-time workers took on additional hours but there 
was no evidence of pressure to work them or a desire for longer hours. A student working part-
time at N-CoffeeA commented how her manager would ask her to do an extra shift: ‘I’m 
flexible with the time, and sometimes I want to earn more money… but if I do have much on 
at school… I just say sorry’. 
Some students switch to working full-time during vacations without necessarily 
changing their contracts. One ex-student at N-Multibrand remained on a 0.2 contract despite 
working full-time hours. However, there was limited evidence of these practices across the 
companies. While some workers had fixed hours each day, others worked on rotating shift 
systems, normally scheduled four weeks in advance. The biggest contrast with the UK was that 
full-time workers typically worked Monday to Friday, with some working very occasionally at 
weekends or at most one weekend in four. Saturdays and Sundays were normally covered by 
part-time students. As one full-time worker explained: ‘I do step in if someone is sick or I need 
the extra money’ (Eva, N-BakerA). Overall, there were few complaints about hours worked or 
the organisation of rotas. As one worker noted: ‘When I was new I worked a lot of late shifts 
and I didn’t like that so now I have worked here for a long time I’ve been working more early 
shifts’ (Lisa, N-Multibrand).  
In Norway, a national union officer with Fellesforbundet stated that many employers 
flout the regulations and evidence from the Labour Inspectorate supports these claims 
(Tariffnemndas 2017). The main area where café workers asked for union assistance was said 
to be in obtaining ‘more hours’: 
even though they don’t have a collective agreement… we force [the 
manager] to make a schedule… you will not be able to just send people on 
the break or send people home because you see that it is less people 
[customers] coming in that day. (Union official, Fellesforbundet) 
There was no evidence from the cases of these type of practices, suggesting that they may be 
more common in other parts of hospitality.  
In France and Norway, there is predictability in the scheduling of work and the number 
of working hours in each week. However, this did not mean all workers were on the same type 
of contracts. Variability did exist, reflecting the needs of employers but also the availability in 
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the local labour market of a student workforce in both countries and low qualified young people 
in France. The evidence indicates no systematic differences in approach due to product market 
position or organisations with active trade unions. In the UK, conditions were much more 
variable and some employers were making full use of their freedom to decide working time 
practices in their favour. 
 
National, Sector and Organisation Interactions 
How do these findings from the café industry contribute to analysing the role of national 
institutions, sector and organisation in shaping pay and working time outcomes? Wages in all 
three countries are towards the bottom of the pay hierarchy, although national differences 
emerge in relation to the level of ‘the bottom’. Compared to the UK, French café assistants 
benefit from a higher-level minimum wage and a mechanism for uprating indexed to inflation 
and average wages. Norwegian café workers receive the highest pay in real terms, with relative 
pay similar to France, as most employers conform to the collective agreement rates in the 
context of a tight labour market. 
Some Norwegian café workers, however, were falling through the gaps, which reflects 
the problems of relying on collective agreements in a sector where union organisation remains 
difficult. Subsequent to this study, the main national union confederation, LO, submitted a case 
to the Tariffnemndasin (Tariff Commission), for the extension of collectively agreed minimum 
rates to all workers in the sector. Despite employer opposition, this became law in 2018, with 
a minimum rate of 157.18 NOK (or 64 percent of the median) for adult workers. This indicates 
the power that unions can still exert in a sector such as hospitality where the national system is 
supportive of trade unions and provides effective channels for voice and influence. 
There was also evidence of national institutional effects in working time and 
scheduling. It seems that legislation in France and Norway has been the primary factor in 
ensuring the security and predictability of working hours. In France, the Code du travail and 
the legal extension of sectoral agreements provide an inclusive platform of rights, which 
employers in the café industry generally appear to follow. This may indicate a certain amount 
of ‘societal normality’ of the legislation (Lehndorff 2014), although the recent introduction of 
further national restrictions on part-time working indicates broader problems of enforcement. 
These findings support Berg et al’s (2014) categorisation of France as representing the 
‘mandated’ model. However, the ‘negotiated’ configuration does not appear to apply to the 
Norwegian café sector, where many workers fall outside of the collective agreement and rely 
on weak provisions in the Work Environment Act and unilateral employer discretion. Although 
 19 
 
legal requirements seem to be followed by cafés in this study, there are many breaches in the 
wider hospitality sector. In the UK, evidence signals a ‘unilateral’ employer approach, with a 
shift towards more insecurity and variability in contracts, leading to workers having the most 
difficulty in securing adequate incomes and stability in work-life balance. 
Given the weakness of national regulations and sector collective bargaining in the UK, 
we might have expected the organisational level to be more important in determining pay and 
working time outcomes than in Norway and France. Figure 2 offers a visual representation of 
the extent of variation in pay and working-time outcomes among cafés in each country. In 
relation to pay on the vertical axis, differences are greatest in Norway. This reflects the success 
of trade unions, at the top end, achieving company collective agreements above the sector tariff, 
and at the bottom end, the ability of a ‘low road’ employer to pay below the ‘going rate’. The 
evidence indicates that there is room for these different types of employers in Norway, with 
little sign that the ‘low road’ employer – also a low cost competitor – was threatening the 
viability of other more quality-based organisations. The space for a range of service offerings 
may explain the unwillingness of the employer organisation in this sector to support the 
extension of the collective agreement. In comparison, in the cleaning sector, large employers 
were threatened by low paying contractors and supported extension (Torvatn 2011) 
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Pay variation among cafés was lowest in France, and fairly limited in the UK, reflecting 
the centrality of the national minimum wage to pay determination in both countries. There is 
little evidence that product market strategy makes a significant difference or that there are many 
employers pursuing ‘high road’ approaches to job quality. Trade unions appear to play a greater 
role than employer ‘strategy’ in accounting for differences in pay. The impact was primarily 
felt on basic pay in the UK (7 percent above the minimum wage) and on ‘13th month’ payments 
in France (adds over 8 percent to the minimum wage). Although no problems of enforcement 
were found in the case study organisations, there is other evidence of illegal underpayments in 
hospitality organisations in the UK (DBIS/DHSC 2015). 
 Working time practices, shown on the horizontal axis of Figure 2, were relatively 
homogenous in France where organisations conform to strong legal mandates. There was 
slightly more variation in Norway, related primarily to payments for unsocial hours working. 
Organisational differences were far greater in the UK, where weak legal regulations are 
consistent with a variety of employer approaches. More long-standing organisations still 
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provide relative stability, while newer rapidly expanding coffee shop chains adopt more 
insecure working time practices. These chains were generally operating in the mid-market and 
not competing on low prices. All but one organisation was performing well financially, 
indicating that their use of variable hour contracts and short-notice shift changes was more 
about maintaining profit margins than survival.  
 
Conclusion 
The findings from the café industry in France, Norway and the UK reveal that while the sector 
is an important analytical category, national institutions and regulations remain significant in 
shaping pay and working time outcomes. Even where the dominant national mode of regulation 
is lacking in a sector, the example of Norway shows how legal rights, social norms, welfare 
protections and a tight labour market can provide some compensation for gaps in collective 
bargaining arrangements. While the sector exerts many common pressures on organisations, 
the research indicates that they do not have to overwhelm the possibility for more progressive 
outcomes even in what is considered an unpromising environment.  
Furthermore, the findings question any assumption that there might be greater scope 
for employer choice as a lever for significant improvement in countries where regulatory 
standards are weaker. Business strategy may make some difference within a country but for 
sectors where work is designed around relatively low skilled jobs, gains may prove marginal. 
In all three countries in this study, unions were more important for enhancing pay and, to a 
limited extent, improving working time practices. However, in most cases, trade unions are 
absent from these types of workplaces. Significant gains, therefore, rely predominantly on the 
power of trade unions and other groups to exert pressure at national level through state policy. 
Examples include the legal extension of collective agreements in Norway, which adds to, rather 
than departs from, the national approach to labour market regulation, and the tightening of 
legislation in relation to part-time work in France. 
Indeed, progress is more likely when working within the grain of existing national 
institutions and traditions. In the UK, enhancing the level of the national minimum wage 
(building on the recent introduction of the ‘National Living Wage’) would face less employer 
opposition and not require any institutional or regulatory change, compared to legislation for 
sectoral collective bargaining.  Nevertheless, the role of state regulation remains essential not 
just to improving pay but, perhaps more significantly, to working time arrangements in poorly 
organised sectors. Berg et al (2014:834) stress ‘the limitations of mandating working-time 
practices by the state when labor unions and other worker representatives are weak.’ Although 
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this argument has merit in emphasising the need for effective workplace enforcement, in some 
contexts there may be no other option.  
These findings, however, only relate to one part of one sector. With the exception of 
one or two studies (e.g. Gautié and Schmitt 2010), there is little systematic comparative 
research on pay and working time outcomes in the broader hospitality, retail and business 
service industries where some of the worst conditions have been reported. Problems with the 
enforcement of legal rights may be more prevalent in other sectors or occupations, where 
further research would be welcome. It is clear that improving job quality in these types of 
sectors is not easy and requires a greater focus on exploring effective ways of influencing state 
policy to support both progressive regulation and union organisation. 
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Table 1: Key features of the case study organisations 
 
Organisation Type1 Collective 
agreement 
Hourly Pay 
(national 
currency) 
UK    
UK-CoffeeA 
(3 outlets) 
Large coffee chain No 5.80–6.10 
UK-CoffeeB Medium coffee chain & franchise  No 5.80 
UK-CoffeeC Large coffee chain No 5.80 
UK-CoffeeD 
(2 outlets)  
Large coffee chain No 5.85–6.50 
UK-Multibrand 
(2 outlets) 
MNC large chain & contractor No 5.80 
UK-Sandwichco 
(2 outlets) 
MNC large franchise sandwich 
chain 
No 5.80 
UK-BakerA Large bakery chain Yes 6.20 
UK-BakerB Medium bakery chain No 5.80 
UK-Indep Independent café  No 5.80 
UK-RetailA Large retail chain café  No 6.20–6.53 
UK-RetailB Medium contractor in retail outlet No 5.80 
Norway  
  
N-CoffeeA Small coffee chain No 123 
N-Multibrand 
(2units) 
MNC large chain & contractor Yes 131–150 
N-Sandwichco MNC large franchise sandwich 
chain 
No 95 
N-BakerA 
(2 units) 
Small bakery chain & franchise No 120–150 
N-BakerB Small bakery chain Yes 130 
N-BakerC Small bakery chain  No 115 (16yrs old) 
N-BakerD Small bakery chain  No 114–140 
N-BakerE Small bakery chain No 125 
N-Indep Independent café No 120 
France  
 
 
F-SandwichA Large sandwich chain & 
franchise 
Fast food 9 
F-SandwichB Medium sandwich chain & 
franchise 
Fast food 9 
F-SandwichC Medium sandwich & franchise Fast food & 
company 
9 
F-SandwichD Large contractor Fast food & 
company 
9 
F-Multibrand MNC large chain & contractor Fast food & 
company 
9 
F-Univ (2 outlets) Public sector café  Civil service 9.42–10.28 
F-BakerA 
(3 outlets) 
Large chain & franchise Bakery & company 
Fast food  
9-9.12 
F-BakerB Independent bakery Bakery 10 
F-IndepA Independent sandwichery Fast food 9 
F-IndepB Independent sandwichery Fast food 9 
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F-IndepC Independent sandwichery Fast food 9 
F-IndepD Independent bakery Fast food 9 
F-IndepE Independent bakery Fast food 9 
1Large chain: over 250 outlets, medium chain: 50–250, small chain: under 50. 
 
Table2: Legal regulation and sector collective agreement on pay and working time, 2011 
 
 UK Norway France 
Minimum Wage Yes; age variation  Yes 
Other important 
national minimums  
 Overtime 140%; 
contracts in line with 
hours worked; 2 weeks’ 
notice of shift changes 
 
Hospitality sector 
collective agreement 
   
    Pay  Wage scale (age/ skill 
variation) 
Wage scale (skill 
variation); annual bonus 
120-220€ 
   Shift changes  4 weeks’ notice 10 days’ notice  
   Part-time contracts   Minimum 22 hours 
from 2012 (24 hours 
from 2014) 
Additional hours 
maximum 33% of the 
contract (overtime pay 
if more than 10%) 
   Overtime rates  150-200% 125-150% 
   Unsocial hours  Weekend work 115%; 
night work 130% 
Night work 110-125% 
 
 
Table 3: Café worker pay in the case study organisations 
 
Pay range Typical 
pay 
Equivalent in 
euros 30/1/11 
PPS ($) 
equivalent 
% of 
country 
median 
hourly pay 
UK (pounds) 5.80-6.53 5.80 6.941 8.47 52 
France (euros) 9-10.28 9 9 10.66 63 
Norway (krone) 95-150 128 16.24 14.25 62 
 
1Uses £5.93 as minimum wage (October 2010-2011). 
2Calculated using OECD 2011 PPP Benchmarking results, OECD.Stat 
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Figure 1: Pay distribution of highest paid café worker in each case study outlet by country 
 
 
 
Note: n=42, data unavailable for N-BakeryC 
 
 
Figure 2: Variation within the café industry in pay and working time practices 
 
 
 
 
